Coppens, B., Verbauwhede, I., De Bosschere, K., & De Sutter, B. (2009). Practical Mitigations for Timing-Based Side-Channel Attacks on Modern x86 Processors. In Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (pp. 45-60). (Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy). IEEE Computer Society Press.

@inproceedings{42d93a4cce1b40b7b5ce13e39b152c38,
title = "Practical Mitigations for Timing-Based Side-Channel Attacks on Modern x86 Processors",
abstract = "This paper studies and evaluates the extent to which automated compiler techniques can defend against timing-based side-channel attacks on modern x86 processors. We study how modern x86 processors can leak timing information through side-channels that relate to control flow and data flow. To eliminate key-dependent control flow and key-dependent timing behavior related to control flow, we propose the use of if-conversion in a compiler backend, and evaluate a proof-of-concept prototype implementation. Furthermore, we demonstrate two ways in which programs that lack key-dependent control flow and key-dependent cache behavior can still leak timing information on modern x86 implementations such as the Intel Core 2 Duo, and propose defense mechanisms against them.",
keywords = "side channel, security, microarchitecture, compiler backend",
author = "Bart Coppens and Ingrid Verbauwhede and {De Bosschere}, Koenraad and {De Sutter}, Bjorn",
year = "2009",
month = may,
day = "17",
language = "English",
isbn = "978-0-7695-3633-0",
series = "Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy",
publisher = "IEEE Computer Society Press",
pages = "45--60",
booktitle = "Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy",
note = "Finds and Results from the Swedish Cyprus Expedition: A Gender Perspective at the Medelhavsmuseet ; Conference date: 21-09-2009 Through 25-09-2009",
}